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This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a
symmetric oligopolywith capacity-constrained firms.Under two popular definitions of the uniform
price, when each firm sets a price-quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is
easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the corresponding discriminatory auction.
Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. Even when firms may
set bids that are arbitrary finite step functions of price-quantity pairs, in repeated uniform price
auctions maximal collusion is attained with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity
withholding.
1. Introduction
 This article contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated
multiunit uniform price auctions with capacity-constrained firms. As in our earlier work on
discriminatory auctions, we modify the Bertrand-Edgeworth approach by allowing each firm to
simultaneously set a price-quantity pair specifying the firm’s minimum acceptable price and the
maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price.1 Using this game, we analyze the
feasibility of perfect collusion using two different rules for determining the uniform price. Under
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the first rule, which we call the Market Clearing Price rule, the uniform price is equal to the
minimum price at which the quantity offered by the firms is greater than or equal to demand.
Under the second rule, called the Maximum Accepted Price rule, the uniform price is equal
to the highest submitted price at which the residual demand left over from supply provided at
strictly lower prices is strictly greater than zero. Both definitions have been used extensively in
the literature (see, for example, Green and Newbery, 1992; von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993).
When each firm sets a price-quantity pair, there exists a range of discount factors for which
the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in either of the uniform price auctions,
but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be
necessary to sustain this outcome.
We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions
of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum
Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the
discount factor above which the perfectly collusive outcome with equal sharing is sustainable on
a stationary path. Under the Market Clearing Price rule, only one step is required. That is, within
the class of step bidding functions with a finite number of steps, maximal collusion is attained
with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding.
These results are particularly relevant for markets such as electricity markets in which
uniform price and discriminatory auctions govern exchange. Our simple model captures some
of the basic features of operating electricity markets, such as the UK spot market, the Spanish
wholesale market, or the Victoria Power Exchange. In these markets, capacity-constrained firms
compete by offering step bidding functions that vary in their complexity depending on the
market.
The theoretical literature on capacity-constrained uniform price auctions applied to elec-
tricity markets can be traced back to Green and Newbery (1992) and von der Fehr and Harbord
(1993).2 The former assumes that capacity-constrained firms offer continuous supply functions,
whereas the latter assumes that firms submit discrete step functions similar to those in this
article. In both papers the analysis is static, and thus ignores the strategic implications of repeated
interaction. Although, as Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002) note, most electricity markets
provide favorable conditions for firms to collude, surprisingly, little attention has been paid to
the theoretical modelling of collusion in electricity markets. An exception is Fabra’s (2003)
comparison of the uniform price and discriminatory auctions in Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
supergames.
Fabra (2003) has shown that under Bertrand-Edgeworth (B-E) duopoly, divisions of the
monopoly profit can be supported in the infinitely repeated uniform price auction for strictly
lower discount factors than in the infinitely repeated discriminatory auction. However, this result
is only valid for a subset of symmetric capacities for which nonstationary paths with bid rotation
can be sustained as perfect equilibria of the uniform price auction. For example, in the duopoly,
if each firm’s capacity is large enough to supply the monopoly output, incentives to deviate
from perfectly collusive paths in the uniform price auction are no less than in the discriminatory
auction. Furthermore, on the nonstationary paths with bid rotation that minimize incentives to
deviate in the uniform price auction, firms do not equally share monopoly profit. Expanding the
strategy space to price-quantity pairs, thereby allowing for physical withholding, has important
implications for the sustainability of perfect collusion in the uniform price auction. A direct
implication of capacity withholding is that, in contrast to B-E competition, when capacity is such
that n − 1 firms can supply the monopoly output, the monopoly outcome can be supported for
a strictly wider range of discount factors in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory
2 More recent theoretical work related to this study includes Baldick and Hogan (2001), Boom (2003), Borenstein,
Bushnell, and Stoft (2000), Ciarreta and Espinosa (2005), Crampes and Cre´ti (2005), Crawford, Crespo, and Tauchen
(2005), Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord (2006), Garcı´a-Dı´az and Marı´n (2003), Gutie´rrez-Hita and Ciarreta (2003),
Lave and Perekhodstev (2001), Le Coq (2002), and Ube´da (2004).
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auction. Moreover, this result holds even if we restrict attention to stationary paths on which each
firm obtains an equal share of the monopoly profit.
In the discriminatory auction, the incentive to deviate from perfect collusion is minimized
on a stationary path on which each firm sets the monopoly price and offers its whole capacity.
On the other hand, in the uniform price auction, if the uniform price is given by the Market
Clearing Price rule, the stationary path on which each firm withholds capacity to offer its share
of monopoly output at a price below some critical level (strictly lower than the monopoly price)
minimizes firms’ incentives to deviate in the class of stationary paths with equal sharing of
the monopoly profit. If the uniform price is given by the Maximum Accepted Price rule, then
incentives to deviate from perfect collusion are minimized when n − 1 firms withhold capacity
to offer their share of the monopoly output. The remaining firm acts as the price setter and offers
capacity at the monopoly price. Together, these two results provide a conclusive theoretical
link between equilibrium capacity withholding and the ability to support tacitly collusive
outcomes.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and
the simultaneous move price-quantity uniform price auction under two alternative definitions of
the uniform price and characterize the Nash equilibria of the game. In Section 3, we introduce
notation and definitions used in analyzing the price-quantity supergame. In Section 4, we show
that under both formulations of the uniform price, capacity withholding relaxes incentives to
deviate on perfectly collusive stationary perfect equilibrium paths with equal sharing. On such
paths, incentives to deviate are minimized when n firms withhold capacity under the Market
Clearing Price rule and when n − 1 firms withhold capacity under the Maximum Accepted Price
rule. Section 5 extends the results in Section 4 to L-step bidding functions, L ≥ 1, and shows that
bidding functions with at most two steps are sufficient in order to minimize firms’ incentives to
deviate from a perfectly collusive path. One step is required under the Market Clearing Price rule
and two steps under the Maximum Accepted Price rule. Section 6 concludes.
2. The simultaneous move price-quantity game
 The model. Consider a market for a homogeneous good. There are n firms in the industry.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of firms. Firm i’s cost function is such that unit cost ci is
constant up to capacity ki. Firms are symmetric: ki = k and ci = c = 0 for all i. Let d(p) be market
demand and assume that it satisfies the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. d(p) is continuous on [0,∞). ∃ p¯ > 0 such that d(p) = 0 if p ≥ p¯ and d(p) >
0 if p < p¯. d(p) is twice continuously differentiable and d ′(p) < 0 on (0, p¯). Finally, pd(p) is
strictly concave on [0, p¯] with maximizer pm.
These assumptions guarantee that there exists a unique unconstrained monopoly price, pm.
Inverse demand exists and is denoted by P(y), where y is output. To ensure that there exists a
unique Cournot equilibrium with a strictly positive price in the quantity-setting game with n
symmetric firms (without capacity constraints), demand given by d(p), and zero marginal cost,
we further assume3
Assumption 2. d ′(p) + pd ′′(p) < 0 on (0, p¯).
Under assumptions analogous to Assumption 1 for P(y), this is equivalent to assuming
that log P(y) is strictly concave over the relevant range and implies that Cournot quantity
3 See Deneckere and Kovenock (1999), who also compare and contrast these conditions to inverse-demand-based
conditions guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium. Note also that in the absence of capacity
constraints, if ci = 0 for every i, bootstrap Cournot equilibria exist in which equilibrium price is zero and every group of
n − 1 firms sets their aggregate quantity q > d(0).
C© RAND 2007.
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best-response functions are downward sloping (see Deneckere and Kovenock, 1999). Denote
by r(z) a firm’s Cournot best response to an aggregate quantity z set by other firms. That is, r(z)
maximizes P(x + z)x with respect to x. Let yc be the quantity set by each firm in the Cournot
equilibrium with strictly positive price.
In the one-shot simultaneous move price-quantity game, firms simultaneously set price-
quantity pairs, (p, q), where p ∈ R+ and q ∈ [0, k]. Firm i’s strategy space is thus Si = R+ × [0, k].
A strategy profile (p, q) = ((p1, q 1), . . . , (pn, qn)) is an element of ×ni=1Si. In this article, we restrict
the analysis to pure strategies.
Define qˆi = min{qi , d(0)} to be the effective quantity offered by firm i. Given a strategy
profile (p, q) and a coordinate p ∈ R+ of the price vector p, define the set L(p |p, q) ≡
{i ∈ N | pi = p}. L(p |p, q) is the set of firms setting price p. We have L(p |p, q) = ∅ if
for all i , pi = p. Let L−(p |p, q) ≡ ∪z<p L(z |p, q) be the set of all firms charging a price strictly
less than p. To simplify notation, we often drop the argument (p, q).
We assume efficient rationing. Hence, given a strategy profile (p, q), the residual demand
faced by firms in L(p) is





q j , 0
⎫⎬
⎭ .
If L−(p) is empty, then we define R(p |p, q) = d(p). Note that here the residual demand is the
demand left over from supply provided at strictly lower prices.
If, in case of a tie in price at p, we assume that firms share residual demand in proportion to
their effective quantities offered, then for i ∈ L(p | p, q), sales are








In this context, the literature has defined a uniform price auction in two distinct ways. We
will examine each in turn. In the first definition, we follow Green and Newbery (1992), who use
a specification in which the uniform price is the price at which the quantity demanded is equal
to the quantity supplied (see also Boom, 2003; Ube´da, 2004; Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord,
2006). This formulation leaves open the possibility that the uniform price will not be one of the
submitted bids. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
Definition 1 (market clearing price). Given a strategy profile (p, q) in the uniform price auction,









where L(p |p,q) = L−(p |p,q) ∪ L(p |p,q).
Definition 2 is the approach used by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) (see also Crampes
and Cre´ti, 2005; Fabra, 2003; Le Coq, 2002). The price each firm receives in the uniform price
auction is equal to the maximum accepted price, where the maximum accepted price is the
highest submitted price at which the residual demand left over from supply provided at strictly
lower prices is strictly positive. Note that in this definition, the uniform price must be one of
the submitted prices, and thus may not clear the market. See Figure 1 for an illustration. For
Definition 2, we require slightly more notation. Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) and define
P(p,q) = {p ∈ {p1, . . . , pn} | R(p |p,q) > 0}.
P(p,q) is the set of submitted prices with R(p |p, q) > 0.
C© RAND 2007.
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FIGURE 1
DETERMINING THE UNIFORM PRICE UNDER DEFINITION 1 AND DEFINITION 2
Definition 2 (maximum accepted price). Given a strategy profile (p, q) in the uniform price
auction, the uniform price Pa(p, q) is equal to the maximum accepted price, that is
Pa(p,q) = maxP(p,q) if P(p,q) = ∅,
and
Pa(p,q) = p¯ if P(p,q) = ∅.
For u ∈ {e, a}, firm i’s payoff, i = 1, . . . , n, under the two alternative definitions is simply
πi (p,q) = Pu(p,q)si (pi |p,q).
Before proceeding with the characterization of equilibria, we first justify our assumption
of efficient rationing. Note that our choice of the efficient rationing rule does not play a role in
Definition 1. The market clearing price does not depend on the specific rationing rule used, but
only on the vector of price-quantity pairs submitted by the firms. Moreover, every consumer that
obtains a unit of the good pays the same price per unit no matter which firm supplies it. It follows
that without cross-subsidization between consumers, any consumer who obtains a unit must be
willing to pay at least the uniform price for that unit.
When the uniform price is defined as in Definition 2, the firms’ prices are ranked in increasing
order, with the lowest-price firms selling first. If demand were not rationed efficiently, at some
strategy profiles, there would exist consumers who would be required to pay more than their
C© RAND 2007.
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reservation value at the uniform price. Implementation of other rationing rules would therefore
require cross-subsidization of consumers.4
 Pure strategy equilibria. We now define critical prices that are useful in characterizing a
firm’s profit from deviating from a given profile. We also characterize a firm’s minmax payoff.
First, for q < d(0), define the residual demand monopoly price for a firm with capacity k,
pr(k, q):
pr (k, q) ≡ max { arg max
p
{p[d(p) − q]}, P(k + q)}.
pr(k, q) is unique for every pair (k, q) given our assumptions on demand. From the strict
concavity of pd(p), it is clear that whenever pr(k, q) is strictly positive, it is strictly decreasing
in q. A firm’s profit from setting pr(k, q) after lower-price firms have sold a quantity q is
π
¯
(k, q) ≡ pr (q)[d(pr (q)) − q]. For q ≥ d(0), a firm’s residual demand after other firms have
sold a quantity q is zero for all p. In this case, we define pr(k, q) ≡ 0 and it follows that
π
¯
(k, q) = 0 for all q ≥ d(0).
Defining pr ≡ pr(k, (n − 1)k), it is straightforward to show that if (n − 1)k < d(0), then a




= pr [d(pr ) − (n − 1)k] > 0. If (n − 1)k ≥ d(0), then by definition,
pr((n − 1)k) = 0 and each firm’s minmax payoff is π
¯
= 0.
Following Deneckere and Kovenock (1992), let p
¯
(k, q) be the unique price less than or equal
to pr(k, q) at which a firm is indifferent between being the low-price firm at p
¯
(k, q) and being




(k, q) is equal to the
smallest solution to
p × min{d(p), k} = π
¯
(k, q).
If q < d(0), then p
¯
(k, q) > 0. If q ≥ d(0), by definition π
¯
(k, q) = 0, and thus p
¯
(k, q) = 0. In the




(k, (n − 1)k). Moreover, because ki = k for
every i, when there is no ambiguity we use pr(q) to denote pr (k, q), π
¯





(q) to denote p
¯
(k, q).
We can now state the following proposition describing equilibrium in the one-shot price-
quantity uniform price auction with common capacities ki = k and common unit costs ci = 0, for
every i, which we denote by u(k, 0), where u ∈ {e, a} indicates the definition of the uniform
price that is employed.
Proposition 1. The sets of pure strategy equilibria, Eu(k, 0), of the one-shot uniform price
auctions u(k, 0), u = e, a, are completely characterized as follows.
(i) Suppose k ≤ yc. Then Ea(k, 0) = {(p∗,q∗) | p∗i ≤ P(nk) and q∗i = k, ∀i ∈ N , with
p∗j = P(nk) for at least one j ∈ N } and Ee(k, 0) = {(p∗,q∗) | p∗i ≤ P(nk) and q∗i = k,
∀i ∈ N }.
(ii) Suppose k ≥ d(0)
n−1 . Then E
a(k, 0) = {(p∗,q∗) | ∃ i, j, i = j, such that p∗i = p∗j = 0 and
∀h ∈ L(0 |p∗,q∗),∑l∈L(0 | p∗,q∗)\{h} qˆ∗l ≥ d(0)}. Define C(0) ≡ {(p∗,q∗) | p∗i ≤ p
¯
((n −
1)yc) and q∗i = yc, ∀i ∈ N }. Then Ee(k, 0) = Ea(k, 0) ∪ C(0).
(iii) Suppose k ∈ (yc, d(0)
n−1 ). Define y
¯
to be the unique y ∈ (d(pr) − (n − 1)k, k)
such that π
¯
((n − 2)k + y) = prk. Then Ea(k, 0) = {(p∗,q∗) | ∃ j ∈ N such that p∗j =
pr and q∗j ∈ [y
¯
, k] and ∀i = j, p∗i ≤ p
¯
, and q∗i = k} and Ee(k, 0) = Ea(k, 0) ∪ C(0),
where C(0) is as defined in (ii).
Moreover, for every k ∈ R+, u ∈ {e, a}, and i ∈ N , there exists a pure strategy equilibrium
of u(k, 0) in which πi (p∗,q∗) = π
¯
.
4 As Davidson and Deneckere (1986) have shown, in discriminatory auctions, the firms’ payoffs depend on the
particular rationing scheme employed. One prominent alternative to efficient rationing is proportional rationing. The
implications of assuming efficient rationing rather than proportional rationing are explored in Section 4, where we
compare uniform price and discriminatory auctions.
C© RAND 2007.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that, under both rules for determining the uniform price, if each
firm’s capacity k is less than or equal to its n-firm Cournot output, each firm sets price at or
below the capacity clearing price P(nk) and sells its capacity. If, for this range of capacities, the
Maximum Accepted Price rule is used in determining the market price, at least one of the firms
must set price equal to P(nk).
For k in the classical Bertrand region where any (n − 1) firms have sufficient capacity to
satisfy the whole market demand d(0) at unit cost c = 0, the uniform price is always zero in the
auction with the Maximum Accepted Price rule. This requires that at least two firms price at zero
and set quantities sufficiently large that any unilateral deviation to a higher price yields zero sales.
These classical Bertrand equilibria are also contained in the set of equilibria under the Market
Clearing Price rule. However, under this rule, the equilibrium set also contains Cournot-like
equilibria in which all firms set prices at or below p
¯
((n − 1)yc) and sell their Cournot quantity
yc. The uniform price in these equilibria is the Cournot price P(nyc).
For k ∈ (yc, d(0)
(n−1) ), the intermediate range between the Cournot output and the classical
Bertrand region, for each j ∈ N , there exists a continuum of equilibria in which firm j sets p∗j =
pr and all other firms price at or below p
¯
. The (n − 1) low-price firms all have sales equal to
capacity k and firm j sells to residual demand. In these equilibria, the quantity that firm j places
on the market must be sufficient to deter a unilateral deviation by a low-price firm to a price
above pr. The critical supply that achieves this is the quantity y
¯
defined in Proposition 1, so j
must supply at least y
¯
, which we show is greater than residual demand d(pr) − (n − 1)k. Under
the Maximum Accepted Price rule, these equilibria define the complete set of equilibria. For the
Market Clearing Price rule, the set must again be augmented by the set of Cournot-like equilibria
described in the previous paragraph.
In our analysis of the repeated uniform price auctions that follows, the most important aspect
of the characterization in Proposition 1 is the fact that, under both uniform price rules, for any
common capacity k and any firm i there exists a one-shot Nash equilibrium in which i receives
its minmax profit π
¯
. This allows the direct construction of credible punishments in the repeated
uniform price auctions that force any unilaterally deviating firm down to its minmax per-period
continuation payoff.
3. The price-quantity supergame
 In this section, we examine the supergame u(k, 0, δ) obtained by infinitely repeating the
one-shot game u(k, 0) and discounting payoffs with discount factor δ < 1. In the supergame,
a path τ is an infinite sequence of action profiles {(pt , qt )}∞t=0. A pure strategy σ i for firm i is a
sequence of functions, {σ i (t)}∞t=0, such that for every t , σ i (t) : H t → Si , where Ht is the set of
possible histories ht = (p0, q0, . . . ,pt−1, qt−1) up to time t and h0 is the null history. A strategy
profile is a vector σ = (σ 1, . . . , σ n). Each strategy profile generates an infinite path τ (σ ). Firm
i’s normalized discounted value from period s along a given path τ = {(pt , qt )}∞t=0 is given by





We refer to Vi(τ , t) for t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , as firm i’s continuation value at t. We let Vi(τ ) ≡
Vi(τ , 0) denote the payoff associated with the entire path. A security-level punishment for firm i is
a path on which firm i obtains the discounted sum of its minmax profit, equal to π
¯
in normalized
terms. The result below establishes that a perfect equilibrium security-level punishment in pure
strategies exists under both definitions of the uniform price. After any unilateral deviation by firm
i, firm i’s punishment consists of reverting to a static equilibrium in every period.
Proposition 2. For every k ∈ R+, δ ∈ (0, 1), u ∈ {e, a}, and i ∈ N , there exists a perfect
equilibrium of u(0, k, δ) which serves as a security-level punishment for firm i.
C© RAND 2007.
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Proof. From Proposition 1, the simultaneous move game has a pure strategy equilibrium in
which firm i obtains its minmax payoff, ∀i and k. Because repeating a minmax one-shot
Nash equilibrium forever is a perfect equilibrium security-level punishment, the result follows
directly. Q.E.D.
In the continuation, we assume that each firm’s capacity is larger than its share of the
monopoly output, k > d(p
m )
n
. If, on the other hand, k ≤ d(pm )
n
, all firms are capacity constrained in
the one-shot Nash equilibrium and equilibrium payoffs are Pareto optimal. Thus, the simultaneous
move equilibrium is a collusive outcome immune to deviations for any discount factor.
Consider a stationary path τ = {(p1, q 1), (p2, q 2), . . . , (pn, qn)}. Let π ∗i (p−i , q−i ) be firm
i’s optimal deviation profit as a function of the prices and quantities set by the remaining n − 1
firms. Formally, π ∗i (p−i , q−i ) = sup{pi ,qi } πi (pi , qi , p−i , q−i ). Because from Proposition 2 a perfect
equilibrium security-level punishment exists, the incentive constraints that provide the perfect
equilibrium conditions for the stationary path τ are simply
(1 − δ)[π ∗i (p−i , q−i ) − Pu(p,q)si (pi |p,q)] ≤ δ[Pu(p,q)si (pi |p,q) − π¯ ] (1)
for every i ∈ N and u ∈ {e, a}. In the continuation, we refer to the difference between firm i’s
one-period profit obtained from deviating optimally in period t and its one-period profit from
conforming to the prescribed path as firm i’s incentive to deviate. In equation (1), the incentive to
deviate is given by the term in the square brackets on the left-hand side.
In the next section, we characterize all stationary paths that achieve the monopoly outcome
and on which firms share monopoly profits equally. We show that under both uniform pricing
rules, there is a range of discount factors for which capacity withholding is necessary for such
paths to be supported as perfect equilibrium paths.
4. Capacity withholding and market sharing
 In this section, we focus attention on a specific class of paths. We consider paths τ that are
stationary and on which the normalized payoffs satisfy
∑
i∈N Vi (τ ) = pmd(pm) ≡ m . We say that
such paths are perfectly collusive. In the remainder of this section, we also impose the condition
that πi (p,q) = mn ; that is, firms share monopoly profits equally. We call a path satisfying the
two conditions above a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing. Note that on such
a path, sales are symmetric, although price-quantity pairs need not be.
Lemma 1 below is useful in characterizing the perfectly collusive stationary paths with
equal sharing on which firms’ incentives to deviate are minimized. Consider two profiles of
price-quantity pairs for firm i’s rivals, (p′−i , q−i ) and (p−i , q−i ), such that for j = i , firm j’s price
is no lower in (p′−i , q−i ) than it is in (p−i , q−i ), but the ordering of the prices across firm i’s rivals,
as well as their quantity ceilings, are the same in both profiles. Lemma 1 states that firm i’s profit
from an optimal deviation when its rivals set (p′−i , q−i ) cannot be lower than when they set (p−i ,
q−i ). Note that this result follows from the conditions imposed on the profiles (p, q) and (p′, q)
in the statement of the lemma, which are sufficient to guarantee that for every p, residual demand
at price p is at least as large when i’s rivals set (p′−i , qi) as when they set (p−i , q i ).
Lemma 1. Suppose p = (p1, . . . , pn) and p′ = (p′1, . . . , p′n) satisfy the two following conditions:
for some i ∈ N , (i) ∀ j = i , p′j ≥ pj and (ii) ∀ j , h ∈ N\{i}, pj ≥ ph implies p′j ≥ p′h . Then for
any vector of quantities q = (q 1, . . . , qn), π ∗i (p′−i , q−i ) ≥ π ∗i (p−i , q−i ).
Proof. Suppose that when the n − 1 remaining firms set (p−i , q−i ), firm i’s optimal deviation is
to undercut all n − 1 firms. Because for every j = i , p′j ≥ pj, firm i’s optimal deviation profit
under (p−i , q−i ) can also be obtained by undercutting all other firms when they set (p′−i , q−i ).
Thus, its deviation profit cannot be lower in this case. Now suppose that if i’s rivals set (p−i , q−i ),
firm i’s optimal deviation consists of setting the residual demand monopoly price after a group
of l ≥ 1 firms have sold a quantity q, pr(q), to earn π
¯
(q). We show that i cannot obtain less than
C© RAND 2007.
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π
¯
(q) by deviating when its rivals set (p′−i , q−i ). First, consider the difference in firm i’s residual













qˆ j , 0
}
.
From conditions (i) and (ii) in the statement of the lemma, it follows that L−(p |p′, q) ⊆ L−(p |p,
q) and, thus,
∑
j∈L−(p | p′,q)\{i} qˆ j ≤
∑
j∈L−(p | p,q)\{i} qˆ j . Consequently, residual demand at p is weakly
larger when other firms set (p′−i , qi) than when they set (p−i , q−i ). It follows that if  j for which
p′j = pr(q), then firm i obtains a deviation profit π ∗i ≥ π¯ (q) from setting exactly p
r(q). If ∃ j such
that p′j = pr(q), then i can obtain a payoff arbitrarily close to π
¯
(q) by infinitesimally undercutting
p′j = pr(q). Therefore, we have shown that any deviation profit level firm i can guarantee itself
under (p−i , q i ) can also be obtained when the other firms set (p′−i , q−i ). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 characterizes all perfectly collusive stationary paths with equal sharing. Note that
the characterization is independent of the definition of the uniform price except for statement
(ii).
Lemma 2. Suppose k > d(p
m )
n
. In u(k, 0, δ), on every perfectly collusive stationary path with
equal sharing τ = ((p1, q 1), (p2, q 2), . . . , (pn, qn)), the following must hold: (i) Pu(p, q) = pm,
(ii) pi ≤ pm with equality for at least one firm if u = a, and (iii) for every firm i ∈ N , qi ≥ d(pm )n ,
with equality if firm i sets pi < pm.
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow from the fact that there exists a unique maximizer to pd(p). Thus, if
industry profit is m in every period, pm must be the uniform price in every period as well. It
is straightforward to see that if there exists a firm i for which pi > pm, then, either the uniform
price is strictly greater than pm, or firm i does not have any sales, a contradiction to Vi (τ ) = mn .
Furthermore, if the uniform price is given by Definition 2, pm must also be one of the accepted




, then si <
d(pm )
n
, and thus Vi (τ ) <
m
n
. Hence, qi ≥ d(pm )n . To complete the proof of (iii),
consider first the Maximum Accepted Price rule. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a firm
i for which pi < pm and qi >
d(pm )
n
. From the definition of si, it is clear that the only time a firm’s
sales are strictly below its quantity ceiling occurs when it sells to all or a fraction of residual
demand. If this is the case, however, for firm i, then R(p |p, q) = 0 for every p > pi, which
implies that pm cannot be the uniform price, thus contradicting (i). Hence, it follows immediately
that if pi < pm, qi = d(pm )n . Consider now the Market Clearing Price rule and suppose that there
exists a firm i with pi < pm and qi >
d(pm )
n
. First, note that from Definition 1 and (i), if pj < pm,
∀ j , then it must be the case that ∑h∈N qˆh = d(pm). Otherwise, at least one firm must be setting
pm. Because we have established above that for every j, q j ≥ d(pm )n , it follows directly that if,
additionally, for every j , pj < pm, then
∑
j∈N qˆ j > d(p
m), so that the uniform price is not equal
to pm, a contradiction to (i). Suppose now that l firms, l ≥ 1, are setting pm. Because for every
firm j setting pj < pm, q j ≥ d(pm )n and there exists i for which qi > d(p
m )
n
, it follows that residual
demand at pm is strictly less than l
n
d(pm), so that sh <
d(pm )
n
for at least one firm h setting ph =
pm, a contradiction to the fact that Vh(τ ) = pmsh = mn . Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 shows that there are essentially two ways in which firms can achieve a perfectly
collusive outcome with equal sharing on a stationary path. All firms may set the monopoly price
and offer the same quantity ceiling. In this case, the sales function prescribes that each firm will
obtain an equal share of demand at the monopoly price. Alternatively, a group of firms (possibly
empty under the Market Clearing Price rule) may set the monopoly price and share residual
demand after another group of (strictly lower-price) firms offer their share of the monopoly
output and sell their quantity. We show in the following sections that the crucial difference
between the Market Clearing Price and Maximum Accepted Price approaches is that if the former
is used, in sustaining collusion there can be as many as n low-price firms, whereas there must be
at least one firm setting pm under the latter.
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 The Market Clearing Price rule. Building on the insight from Lemma 2, we construct a
perfect equilibrium path τme and show that given the imposed stationarity and equal division, such
a path minimizes incentives to deviate for all firms among perfectly collusive stationary paths
achieving the same payoff per firm. To this effect, let qm− = (n − 1) d(p
m )
n




(qm− ) and qi =
d(pm)
n
,∀i ∈ N .
Lemma 3. Suppose k > d(p
m )
n
. In e(k, 0, δ), the path τme minimizes incentives to deviate in the
class of perfectly collusive stationary paths with equal sharing.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The path constructed in Lemma 3 is symmetric. Each firm withholds capacity and sets a
quantity equal to its share of the monopoly output and a price equal to the maximum price that no
firm would want to unilaterally undercut. From Definition 1, it is straightforward to check that the
uniform market price is then equal to the monopoly price. The proposition below shows that for
some discount factors, withholding is necessary to sustain perfect collusion with equal sharing
on a stationary path. The crucial effect of capacity withholding on collusion is that in markets
with a large aggregate capacity, it allows firms to set lower prices without affecting the uniform
price, thereby substantially reducing incentives to deviate for all firms.
It is important to note that setting pi = p
¯
(qm− ) is not necessary to support this outcome. Every
path on which each firm offers exactly its share of monopoly output at a price less than or equal
to p
¯
(qm− ), for example at the marginal cost of zero, yields the same outcome and exactly the same
incentives to deviate as τme.
Proposition 3. Suppose k > d(p
m )
n
. There exists a δ¯ < 1 such that in e(k, 0, δ), perfect collusion
with equal sharing is sustainable on a stationary path on which no firm withholds capacity if and
only if δ ≥ δ¯. Furthermore, there exists a δ
¯
e < δ¯ such that if δ ∈ [δ
¯
e, δ¯), perfect collusion with
equal sharing is sustainable on a stationary path and such a path requires that some subset of
the firms withholds capacity. If δ = δ
¯
e, perfect collusion with equal sharing is sustainable on a
stationary path and such a path requires that all firms withhold capacity.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that from Lemma 2, part (iii), δ¯ is the lowest discount factor such that for all δ ≥ δ¯,
the path on which all firms set the monopoly price pm and offer k can be supported in a perfect
equilibrium. Clearly, both δ¯ and δ
¯
e depend on the common capacity level k and the number of
firms n. In the continuation, as in Proposition 3, we will abuse notation by dropping the arguments
k and n.
 The Maximum Accepted Price rule. If the uniform price is defined as the maximum
accepted price, then the result is slightly different. The fact that the uniform price has to be one of
the submitted prices adds the extra constraint that one firm must set pm on the path. This clearly
increases incentives to deviate for low-price firms when compared to the path τme characterized
above.
Let τmai be characterized as follows, ∀i ∈ N .
pi = pm and qi = k,
pj = p
¯
(qm− ) and q j =
d(pm)
n
, ∀ j = i .
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There exist n such paths corresponding to each of the n players with price pm. Note that on
any such path, τmai , the maximum incentive to deviate across firms is the incentive to deviate of a
low-price firm.
Lemma 4. Suppose k > d(p
m )
n
. In a(k, 0, δ), paths of the form of τmai minimize the maximum
incentive to deviate in the class of perfectly collusive stationary paths with equal sharing.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 4 shows that paths on which n − 1 firms withhold capacity to offer an equal share
of the monopoly output at a low price and one firm sets the monopoly price and offers its whole
capacity minimize the maximum incentive to deviate on paths in that particular class. The next
result shows that if n > 2 and capacity is large enough, by withholding output, firms can sustain
an equal division of the monopoly outcome for a strictly wider range of discount factors than by
offering full capacity.
Again, as for the Market Clearing Price approach, it is important to note that it is not
necessary that low-price firms set pj = p
¯
(qm− ). Every path on which each firm j , j = i , offers
exactly its share of monopoly output at a price less than or equal to p
¯
(qm− ) yields the same outcome
and exactly the same incentives to deviate as τmai .
Proposition 4. Suppose k > d(p
m )
n
. Ina(k, 0, δ), perfect collusion with equal sharing is sustainable
on a stationary path on which no firm withholds capacity if and only if δ ≥ δ¯. Furthermore, suppose
n > 2 and k > 2
n
d(pm). Then there exists a δ
¯
a < δ¯ such that if δ ∈ [δ
¯
a, δ¯), perfect collusion with
equal sharing is sustainable on a stationary path and such a path requires that some subset of
the firms withholds capacity. If δ = δ
¯
a , perfect collusion with equal sharing is sustainable on a
stationary path and such a path requires that at least n − 1 firms withhold capacity.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that for n > 2 and for sufficiently large capacity, withholding capacity
facilitates collusion. The intuition behind the dependence of the result in Proposition 4 on the
number of firms is as follows. For every n, on a perfectly collusive path with equal sharing that
does not feature withholding, an optimal deviation always consists of undercutting the monopoly
price to obtain pm min{k, d(pm)}. On τmai , if there are only two firms in the industry, the single
low-price firm can always undercut the high-price firm, and offer and sell the minimum of demand
and its capacity. On the other hand, when there are more than two firms in the industry, an optimal
deviation takes one of two forms depending on k. For a range of relatively low capacity values, a
low-price firm offers and sells its capacity at a price below pm. In this case, because k is low, the
deviating firm does not affect the uniform price and receives pm for its capacity independently
of the price it sets as long as this price is below pm. However, this statement is only valid if
undercutting the low-price firms and offering capacity does not lower the market price. If k is
large enough that a deviating firm would have to withhold in order not to affect the uniform price
by expanding its quantity up to its capacity, the optimal deviation consists of pricing above the
low-price firms but below the high-price firm. For such values of k, a low-price firm’s deviation
profit is strictly below pm min{k, d(pm)}. Thus, k relatively large is required for withholding to
strictly relax incentive constraints as compared to paths on which no firm withholds.
Fabra (2003) analyzes the feasibility of collusion in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
supergame with the Maximum Accepted Price rule. In Fabra’s model, the two firms must offer
capacity at the price they set. She shows that to support a given level of industry profit, the
paths that minimize firms’ incentives to deviate are nonstationary. On such paths, firms alternate
between being high-price and low-price, so that only one firm, the high-price firm, has an incentive
to deviate in any given period. To support perfect collusion, the high-price firm’s incentive to
deviate on the nonstationary path is lower than that of the low-price firm on the stationary path τmai
constructed in Lemma 4 in this article. Thus, perfect collusion can be supported for lower discount
factors on the nonstationary path with firms switching roles every period than on the stationary
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path with equal sharing. However, on the nonstationary paths, firms do not share industry profit
equally, so that the question of role selection in the first period arises. Moreover, to support perfect
collusion, such paths are feasible only if k < d(pm), because if k ≥ d(pm), the firms’ inability to
withhold capacity implies that to obtain industry profit equal to m , each firm must set pm.5 The
latter observations are all the more relevant in the case n ≥ 3.6 Indeed, the range of capacities for
which alternating nonstationary paths with one high-price firm and no withholding are feasible,
k < d(p
m )
n−1 , shrinks as n increases. If k ≥ d(p
m )
n−1 , we conjecture that nonstationary perfect equilibrium
paths with more than one high-price firm setting pm can be constructed for a range of discount
factors, but it is not clear that they minimize incentives to deviate.
We have focused on one possible division of monopoly profits, namely the symmetric
allocation, in which each firm receives an equal share of industry profit. Other allocations can
also be sustained as perfect equilibria. With symmetric firms and the Market Clearing Price rule,
equal sharing is optimal because on the path τme, all firms have the same incentive to deviate.
However, when the Maximum Accepted Price rule is used, equal sharing may not minimize the
critical value of the discount factor above which perfect collusion is sustainable. This is best
illustrated by considering the duopoly case. For d(p) = max{0, 1 − p} and k = 1
2
, Figure 2
shows the set of sustainable allocations for the low-price firm as a function of the discount factor
on perfectly collusive stationary perfect equilibrium paths similar to τmai . On such paths, the
low-price firm obtains pmsm and the high-price firm obtains pm(d(pm) − sm). s
¯
m is the smallest
allocation and s¯m the largest allocation the low-price firm can obtain on such paths. Along the
curve s
¯
m , the low-price firm’s incentive constraint is binding, whereas along the curve s¯m , the
high-price firm’s constraint binds. At every allocation between s
¯
m and s¯m , both constraints are
slack. It is clear that the critical discount factor obtains at an allocation at which the low-price
firm receives a greater share of monopoly profits.
To summarize, there are two main insights to be gleaned from the analysis of the price-
quantity supergames in this section. First, capacity withholding facilitates collusion on stationary
paths no matter which uniform pricing rule is used. This is because it allows firms to set a price that
minimizes the other firms’ deviation profit without preventing the market price from remaining
at pm. Second, under the Market Clearing Price rule, the reduction in deviation profit achieved on
paths with withholding is larger than under the Maximum Accepted Price Rule because under the
former, no single firm is required to price at pm. Using these results, we now compare repeated
uniform price auctions to repeated discriminatory auctions.
 Uniform price and discriminatory auctions. Another commonly employed auction
mechanism is the discriminatory auction, in which each firm receives the price it bids for its
quantity. Propositions 3 and 4 provide a simple way to compare the two institutions. Recall that δ¯
is the critical value of the discount factor above which a path on which each firm sets the monopoly
price pm and offers its capacity in every period can be supported as a perfect equilibrium in the
repeated uniform price auction. In both the uniform price and the discriminatory auctions, an
optimal deviation from such a path consists of undercutting the monopoly price and offering
capacity. Therefore, δ¯ also represents the critical value of the discount factor above which a
perfectly collusive path with equal sharing is sustainable in the repeated discriminatory auction.
Theorem 1. Suppose k > d(p
m )
n
. Under both definitions of the uniform price, perfect collusion with
equal sharing is sustainable on a stationary path in the repeated uniform price auction whenever
it is sustainable on a stationary path in the repeated discriminatory auction. Moreover, if either (i)
u = e or (ii) u = a, n > 2, and k > 2
n
d(pm) hold, there exists a nondegenerate interval of discount
factors [δ
¯
u, δ¯) for which perfect collusion with equal sharing is sustainable on a stationary path
in the repeated uniform price auction, but not in the repeated discriminatory auction.
5 This is because if one firm sets pm and the other firm p < pm, then the price is equal to p.
6 Fabra (2003) only analyzes the duopoly.
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FIGURE 2
RANGE OF POSSIBLE DIVISIONS OF MONOPOLY OUTPUT FOR THE LOW-PRICE FIRM ON A
STATIONARY PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM PATH FOR d(p) = max{0, 1 − p} AND k = 12
Proof. In the discriminatory auction, it follows from a simple extension of Fabra’s (2003)
Proposition 3 to our price-quantity supergame with n symmetric firms that incentives to deviate
are minimized on symmetric paths on which firms set the same price, pm. Thus, the minimum
value of the discount factor for which a perfectly collusive stationary perfect equilibrium path
with equal sharing exists is obtained from a firm’s incentive constraint on a path on which all
firms offer capacity k at a price equal to pm and is given by δ¯. Hence the result follows from
Propositions 3 and 4. Q.E.D.
The results in Theorem 1 are illustrated for an example with linear demand in Figure 3. Let
d(p) = max{0, 1 − p}. In this case, pm = 1
2
, d(pm) = 1
2
, and yc = 1
n+1 . Suppose that k > y
c.
Using the Market Clearing Price approach, the optimal deviation on τme yields profit equal to
FIGURE 3
CRITICAL VALUES OF THE DISCOUNT FACTOR AS A FUNCTION OF THE NUMBER OF FIRMS FOR
d(p) = max{0, 1 − p} and k = 12
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(n + 1)2
16n2
. Using the Maximum Accepted Price rule, it is simple to show that if n > 2, for j = i , the
optimal deviation on τmai is for j to undercut i but not h = i , j . j’s deviation profit is then equal to
(n + 2)2
16n2
. Assuming k = 1
2






if n = 2,
n−1
n


















if n = 2,
4+n2
(n+2)2 if n = 3, 4, . . . .
Under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, as in Brock and Scheinkman (1985),8 the
relationship between the lower bound on the discount factor for which perfect collusion is
sustainable and the number of firms is always nonmonotonic.9 Therefore, when demand is linear,
the result that for sufficiently low capacity (such that minmax payoffs are strictly positive for
some n), decreasing the number of firms in the industry makes collusion more difficult continues
to hold in the repeated price-quantity uniform price auction. Furthermore, independent of k,
when the Maximum Accepted Price rule is used in the uniform price auction, the number of
firms at which the critical value of the discount factor is minimized is greater in the uniform
price auction than in the discriminatory auction. To see this, recall that in the linear demand case,
Brock and Scheinkman (1985) show that δ¯ is initially decreasing in n. This is because a decrease
in punishment payoffs more than offsets an increase in incentives to deviate for such values
of n. The same holds in the uniform price auction. However, note that d
dn
[ (n + 2)
2
16n2
] < 0, that is,
deviation profit decreases with n in the repeated uniform price auction, whereas deviation profit
is independent of n in the discriminatory auction. Therefore, δ
¯
a must decrease with n for a range
of values of n above the minimizer of δ¯.10 In the uniform price auction with the Market Clearing
Price rule, in our example, even at low values of n an increase in incentives to deviate is not offset
by a decrease in punishment value. Therefore, δ
¯
e increases in n for all n ≥ 2. However, this is not
generally true. The relationship between δ
¯
e and n depends on capacity, k. If k is sufficiently low,
then δ
¯
e decreases with n initially and the relationship between the critical discount factor and the
number of firms is again nonmonotonic.
In ending this section, we should note that, in the discriminatory auction, perfect collusion
with equal sharing cannot arise for a larger set of discount factors under proportional rationing
than under efficient rationing. Under proportional rationing, a firm’s incentive to deviate is still
minimized on a path on which each firm offers capacity at the monopoly price pm and, at this
minimum, the relevant payoffs are equal to those under efficient rationing. It follows that if
incentive constraints are to be relaxed under proportional rationing, it must be because firms
can be held to a payoff in the punishment phase that is lower than their security level under the
efficient rationing rule. However, it is straightforward to show that in the context of our model,
7 All formulas are derived from equations (A1), (A3), (A4), and (A8), which can be found in the Appendix. Figure 3
is drawn treating n as a continuous variable. For n ∈ [2, 3), the specific functional form for each critical value of δ can be
obtained from straightforward calculations.
8 See also Davidson and Deneckere (1984) and Lambson (1987) for analyses of discriminatory auctions in a
Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly supergame.
9 Brock and Scheinkman’s (1985) Figure 2 is drawn for 1 − δ
δ
.
10 In our example, the optimal number of firms is between two and three in both the discriminatory and the uniform
price auction. However, the same intuition as that outlined above also works at values of k for which the optimal number
of firms is greater than three.
C© RAND 2007.
1058 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
security-level payoffs are always at least as large as those under efficient rationing.11 Thus,
collusion under the proportional rationing rule can be no easier to sustain than under efficient
rationing. We argued in Section 2 that proportional rationing in a uniform price auction does
not affect the analysis under the Market Clearing Price rule and does not make sense under
the Maximum Accepted Price rule. Hence, to the extent that the rationing rule may be applied,
proportional rationing only reinforces the result of Theorem 1.12
5. Bid functions with an arbitrary number of steps
 In this section, we generalize the results obtained in the previous section to a setting in
which firms can submit bid functions with an arbitrary finite number of steps. In the one-shot
simultaneous move game u(k, 0, L), assume that a firm’s strategy is a vector of price-quantity




li=1, Li ≤ L and p1i < · · · < pLii . L is a
finite number representing the maximum number of admissible steps in the (nondecreasing) bid
function of each firm. For each pair, the price plii represents the minimum price at which firm i is
willing to sell the quantity increment qlii . We assume p
li
i ∈ R+ and
∑
li
qlii ≤ k. A strategy profile
is a vector of bid functions (p,q) = ((pl11 , ql11 )L1l1=1, . . . , (plnn , qlnn )Lnln=1). We denote by (p−i , q−i ) the
vector composed of firm i’s rivals’ bid functions.
Below we define residual demand and a firm’s sales at a given price in this setting. To this
effect, let li(p) be the index of the step associated with price p in firm i’s strategy, that is, if there
exists li such that p
li
i = p, then li(p) = li. Otherwise, define li(p) ≡ ∅. Let psi be the set of prices
submitted by firm i for each of its quantity increments, psi = {p ∈ R+ | li (p) = ∅}, and let psi (p)
be the set of prices submitted by i that are less than or equal to p. That is, psi (p) = [0, p] ∩ psi .
Define qi(p) to be the quantity increment associated with price p in firm i’s strategy. Formally,
qi (p) =
{
qlii if li (p) = li ,
0 if li (p) = ∅,
so that firm i’s quantity supplied at p is
∑
z∈psi (p) qi (z).
Define qˆi (p) = min{qi (p), d(0)}. Assuming efficient rationing and given a strategy profile
(p, q), residual demand at p is then easily defined as follows.










Note that if the minimum price submitted by any firm is greater than or equal to p, then
R(p |p, q) = d(p). Given a strategy profile (p, q), firm i’s sales at a price p ∈ psi are equal
to








11 Note that for any value of the capacity parameter k, a firm can always set pr, its residual demand monopoly price
after its n − 1 rivals have sold their capacity under efficient rationing, and be certain to obtain at least pr [d(pr) − (n −
1)k], which is its minmax payoff under efficient rationing. It is possible to show that for a wide range of values of k, by
setting pr, a firm obtains a strictly higher payoff under proportional rationing than it does under efficient rationing.
12 The literature on electricity markets that has used the Bertrand-Edgeworth model to analyze both uniform price
and discriminatory auctions has often assumed box demand (see, for instance, Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord, 2006).
In this case, every commonly used rationing rule defines the same residual demand. Fabra (2003), Ube´da (2004), and,
in part of their analysis, Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord (2006) allow for a decreasing demand. In her analysis, Fabra
assumes efficient rationing, whereas Ube´da and Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord assume that even in the discriminatory
auction, every consumer pays the same price given by the market clearing price. Hence, in these studies, residual demand
again coincides with efficient rationing. Although we could find no evidence that efficient rationing has been used in
existing electricity markets, such as the UK pool, that were once organized as discriminatory auctions, as argued above,
the results in this article continue to be relevant even with random rationing. Finally, note that efficient rationing would
arise as the optimal choice of a price-taking system operator who maximizes efficiency with complete information of
consumers’ willingness to pay for each unit.
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and firm i’s profit is π i (p, q) = Pu(p, q) si (p, q), ∀u ∈ {e, a}. Finally, we let π ∗i (p−i , q−i ) denote
firm i’s profit from an optimal deviation when its rivals play (p−i , q−i ).
The supergames obtained by repeating the component game above are defined in a similar
manner as the supergame with L = 1. We denote the supergame in which the number of admissible
steps is L by u(k, 0, δ, L), for u ∈ {e, a}. Lemma 5 below simplifies the analysis of the games
with L-step bidding functions by showing that, when compared to the price-quantity approach,
expanding the strategy space does not allow firms to obtain greater one-period deviation payoffs.
Lemma 5. For every k ∈ R+, L ≥ 1, u ∈ {e, a}, and i ∈ N in the game u(k, 0, L), π ∗i (p−i , q−i ),
firm i’s optimal deviation payoff when its rivals set (p−i , q−i ) can be obtained by restricting its
response to bidding functions using a single step (Li = 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The extension of Lemmas 3 and 4 to the more general setting introduced above is relatively
straightforward. Statements similar to those in Proposition 2 and Lemmas 1 and 2 are valid.
Beginning with Proposition 1 and making use of Lemma 5, note that the pure strategy equilibria
for the simultaneous move game characterized for L = 1 are clearly equilibria of the simultaneous
move game with L ≥ 2 admissible steps. We hence have the following result.
Proposition 5. For every k ∈ R+, L ≥ 1, u ∈ {e, a}, and i ∈ N , there exists a pure strategy
equilibrium of the game u(k, 0, L) in which πi (p∗,q∗) = π
¯
.
Allowing for L steps does not change a firm’s minmax profit π
¯
. This is because the worst
that can be imposed on a given firm i is obtained by maximizing i’s profit after its rivals have sold
their capacity at a price of 0. Therefore, Proposition 2 continues to hold when L ≥ 2 because
perfect equilibrium security-level punishments are attained with strategies using only one step.
The analog of Lemma 1 for the case L ≥ 2 states that if for some i ∈ N , (p, q) and (p′, q′)
satisfy the two following conditions: first, the total quantity put on the market by i’s rivals does
not change, and second, the residual demand faced by firm i at every p is no less when firms set
(p′, q′) than when they set (p, q), then firm i’s deviation profit under (p, q) is no greater than




















To generalize Lemma 2, note that the requirements are that the uniform price be pm and that
si (p,q) = d(pm )n . Moreover, supply of lower-priced units should sum up to a quantity less than




Thus, on a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing,∑
j∈N
∑
p∈psj (pm )\{pm }
qˆ j (p) ≤ d(pm) (2)
with a strict inequality if the uniform price is given by the Maximum Accepted Price rule.
Furthermore, if pm ∈ psh, then
13 This quantity must be strictly less than d(pm) if the uniform price is given by the Maximum Accepted Price rule.
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As before, when the uniform price is given by the Market Clearing Price rule, on the perfectly
collusive stationary path that minimizes incentives to deviate, the price will be set at pm by having
firms withhold their capacity to offer only d(p
m )
n
each and set a price that minimizes deviation
profits. When the uniform price is given by the Maximum Accepted Price rule, the highest
accepted bid has to be pm so that at least one firm has to offer a positive quantity at pm.
 The Market Clearing Price rule. For every L ≥ 1, it follows from the above discussion
that a perfectly collusive stationary path that minimizes incentives to deviate is such that all firms
set p = p
¯
(qm− ) and q = d(p
m )
n
. Under the Market Clearing Price definition, one step is sufficient to
minimize incentives to deviate on perfectly collusive stationary paths with equal sharing. Thus,
we have Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Suppose k > d(p
m )
n
. For every number of admissible steps L ≥ 1, in e(k, 0, δ, L),
the path τme minimizes incentives to deviate in the class of perfectly collusive stationary paths
with equal sharing. That is, the incentive to deviate is minimized over all possible finite step
functions by employing a simple (one-step) price-quantity strategy.
Theorem 2 below then follows directly from Propositions 3 and 6. It shows that a path on which
firms use a bidding function with only one step minimizes the critical value of the discount factor
above which a stationary perfect equilibrium path that achieves the monopoly outcome with equal
sharing exists.
Theorem 2. Suppose k > d(p
m )
n
. For every number of admissible steps L ≥ 1, in e(k, 0, δ, L),
perfect collusion with equal sharing is sustainable on a stationary path if and only if δ ≥ δ
¯
e. That
is, if the strategy space is extended to allow for arbitrary finite step functions, whenever perfect
collusion with equal sharing is sustainable using strategies involving more than one step, it is
sustainable employing simple one-step price-quantity strategies.
 The Maximum Accepted Price rule. The difference between the Market Clearing Price
rule and the Maximum Accepted Price rule is that under the latter, on a perfectly collusive path
with equal sharing, at least one firm must set p = pm, whereas this is not required in the former.
However, in contrast to the price-quantity supergame, a firm setting pm may also offer part of its
capacity at prices below pm. The main insight from Lemma 4, namely that incentives to deviate
are minimized when as much capacity as possible is offered at a sufficiently low price, applies
here as well. However, when L ≥ 2, we show that all firms offer some quantity at pm. Because in
our model nothing prevents firms from offering infinitesimally small quantities at a given price,
we conduct the analysis for a given aggregate quantity  sold at pm and show that as this quantity
goes to zero, the lowest discount factor for which perfect collusion is sustainable on a stationary
path with the Maximum Accepted Price approach converges to that in the Market Clearing Price
approach, δ
¯
e. We may interpret  as being part of the tacitly collusive agreement between the
firms.
Define q− ≡ (n−1)(d(p
m )−)
n
and for a given minimum quantity agreement  > 0, consider the
two-step bidding function (pi , q


















Let the path τ  be such that firm i sets (pi , q

i ), ∀i ∈ N . Proposition 7 shows that for a given
quantity agreement  > 0, τ  minimizes incentives to deviate in the class of perfectly collusive
paths with equal sharing. Therefore, in characterizing paths that minimize incentives to deviate
in the class of perfectly collusive stationary paths with equal sharing, two steps are sufficient.
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Proposition 7. Suppose k > d(p
m )
n
. For every number of admissible steps L ≥ 2 and quantity
agreement  ∈ (0, d(pm)], in a(k, 0, δ, L), the path τ  minimizes incentives to deviate in the
class of perfectly collusive stationary paths with equal sharing. That is, the incentive to deviate is
minimized over all possible finite step functions by employing a two-step strategy.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is as follows. Suppose that the aggregate quantity offered
at a common price p < pm is d(pm) − , for some quantity agreement  > 0, where p is










] at pm, while the remaining firms simply offer d(p
m )
n
at p, the uniform price is
indeed pm and each firm earns pm d(p
m )
n
. Furthermore, it is clear that the n − l low-price firms have
greater incentives to deviate than the high-price firms, because they face a strictly higher residual
demand at every price between p and pm. If k is sufficiently small that the price would remain
at pm if a low-price firm offered its capacity at p, then an optimal deviation consists of offering
capacity at p to earn pmk. Otherwise, the optimal deviation is to set the residual monopoly price
after n − 1 firms sell their quantity offered at p, where this quantity is equal to














Now suppose that l = n, so that all firms set k − [ d(pm )−
n
] at pm. Then each firm’s optimal deviation
is to either offer capacity at p or set the residual monopoly price after n− 1 firms sell their quantity









Equation (4) is clearly greater than (3), so that a firm’s deviation profit is lowest when all firms
offer the same quantity both at the low price and the monopoly price. It follows that on a path
that minimizes incentives to deviate, all n firms will offer some quantity at pm. Thus all firms
will have two steps in their bidding function. One of the steps must be at a low price in order to
prevent rivals from undercutting and the quantity offered at that price must be the highest quantity
consistent with pm being the uniform price. The second step effectively sets the price at pm. To
sustain the perfectly collusive outcome, there is nothing to gain from being allowed to include
additional steps in the bidding functions. Theorem 3 below follows directly from Proposition 7.
Theorem 3. Suppose k > d(p
m )
n
. For every number of admissible steps L ≥ 2 and quantity
agreement  ∈ (0, d(pm)], perfect collusion with equal sharing is sustainable on a stationary
path in a(k, 0, δ, L), if and only if τ  is sustainable. Moreover, there exists δ
¯
a() such that τ  is






e as  → 0.
Apart from directly relaxing firms’ incentive constraints on perfectly collusive paths,
allowing for more than one step in a firm’s bidding function generates another interesting
difference as compared to the simple price-quantity approach. If L ≥ 2, on a perfectly collusive
stationary path that minimizes incentives to deviate, firms set identical two-step bidding functions.
This symmetry in firms’ actions is not a property of the most collusive path in the price-quantity
supergame, as a single firm must play the role of the high-price firm. This further implies that
under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, capacity withholding is effective in relaxing incentive
constraints even in a duopoly, while as we have shown in Proposition 4, this is not the case in the
price-quantity approach.
6. Conclusion
 We have examined the nature of collusive stationary perfect equilibrium paths in an infinitely
repeated multiunit uniform price auction with capacity-constrained firms. Under two different
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definitions of the market price in a uniform price auction, each appearing prominently in the
literature, we characterize the set of paths that minimize the incentive to deviate while supporting
the monopoly price with equal sharing of output. We then show that these paths can be supported
as stationary perfect equilibria for a wider range of discount factors than under a repeated
discriminatory price auction.
Using the Market Clearing Price rule to determine the uniform price, we show that extending
firms’ strategy spaces to allow them to place bids involving any finite number of price-quantity
pairs neither enhances nor hinders the firms’ ability to collude. Surprisingly, L-step bidding
functions, L ≥ 2, cannot improve upon the ability to collude with one-step bidding functions,
which involve the simple choice of a price-quantity pair, nor can they make collusion more
difficult to sustain. Because such step functions are quite common in electricity markets, our
analysis extends the analysis of collusion to these more complicated markets with step supply
functions.
Using the Maximum Accepted Price rule, the capacity withholding properties stated above
continue to hold, although with this rule, bidding functions that involve two steps (L ≥ 2) strictly
lower the incentive to deviate from the most collusive outcome when compared to the price-
quantity game (L = 1). Further increases in the number of steps in the bidding function provide
no advantage: collusive outcomes are no easier or harder to support when the strategy space is
extended to L = 3 than with L = 2. Hence, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule as well,
optimal collusion can be attained with a drastically restricted set of available step supply functions
requiring only two steps.
Appendix
 Proofs of Propositions 1, 3, 4, and 7 and Lemmas 3–5 follow.
Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that all strategy profiles described in (i)–(iii) of Proposition 1 form Nash equilibria
of the respective games u(k, 0), u ∈ {e, a}. For k ≤ yc, we show in (a) that Eu(k, 0) is a set of Nash equilibria for
u ∈ {e, a}. For k ≥ d(0)
n−1 and k ∈ (yc, d(0)n−1 ), we show in (b) and (c), respectively, that Ea(k, 0) is a set of Nash equilibria
under both the Market Clearing Price and the Maximum Accepted Price rules. Finally, in (d), we show that for k > yc,
C(0) is an additional set of Nash equilibria under the Market Clearing Price rule. We complete the proof of the proposition
by demonstrating that for each u ∈ {e, a}, the sets of strategy profiles described in (i)–(iii) characterize the complete set
of Nash equilibria of u(k, 0).
(a) Suppose k ≤ yc. Note that in this case, all firms are capacity constrained at pr = p
¯
= P(nk). Furthermore, for
each u ∈ {e, a}, all strategy profiles in the statement of the proposition yield π i (p∗, q∗) = P(nk)k, ∀i ∈ N . To prove
(i), we examine each definition of the uniform price separately. Consider first the Market Clearing Price rule or u = e.
Suppose that there exists a firm i such that ∀ j = i , p∗j ≤ P(nk), and q∗j = k. We show that firm i’s best response to
(p∗−i , q
∗




i ) such that p
∗
i ≤ P(nk) and q∗i = k. Let (pi ′, qi ′) be firm i’s strategy and
Pe ′ the resulting uniform price. Then we either have pi ′ > Pe ′, in which case firm i’s profit from (pi ′, qi ′) is equal to zero,
or pi ′ ≤ Pe ′. In the latter case, one can easily check that Pe ′ = max{pi ′, P((n − 1)k + qi ′)} and that firm i’s sales are
equal to min{qi ′, R(pi ′ | pi ′, qi ′, p∗−i , q∗−i )}. Furthermore, firm i’s payoff is equal to max{pi ′, P((n − 1)k + qi ′)} min{qi ′,
R(pi ′ | pi ′, qi ′, p∗−i , q∗−i )}, which is maximized by setting pi ′ ≤ P(nk) and qi ′ = k, at which firm i obtains a payoff equal
to P(nk)k > 0.
Consider now the Maximum Accepted Price rule or u = a. Suppose that there exists a firm i such that ∀ j = i ,
p∗j ≤ P(nk), and q∗j = k. We show that firm i’s best response to (p∗−i , q∗−i ) is the set of price-quantity pairs (p∗i , q∗i ) such
that p∗i ≤ P(nk) and q∗i = k, unless p∗j < P(nk), ∀ j = i , in which case, p∗i = P(nk) and q∗i = k is firm i’s best response.
Let (pi ′, qi ′) be firm i’s strategy and Pa ′ the resulting uniform price. Again, if pi ′ > Pa ′, firm i obtains a profit of zero.
On the other hand, if (pi ′, qi ′) is such that pi ′ ≤ Pa ′, then firm i’s payoff from (pi ′, qi ′) is given by Pa ′ min{qi ′, R(pi ′ | pi ′,
qi ′, p∗−i , q
∗
−i )}. Because p∗j ≤ P(nk), ∀ j = i , if pi ′ > P(nk), Pa ′ = pi ′ and thus firm i’s payoff is equal to pi ′ min{qi ′,
R(pi ′ | pi ′, qi ′, p∗−i , q∗−i )} < P(nk)k. However, firm i could obtain P(nk)k by decreasing the price to P(nk) and offering
qi ′ = k instead. Furthermore, given any qi ′, firm i’s payoff from setting pi ′ < P(nk) can be no greater than P(nk)k because
k < yc implies p
¯
= P(nk) and p
¯
k = P(nk)k. So suppose p∗j < P(nk), ∀ j = i . If pi ′ < P(nk), it is clear that Pa ′ <
P(nk), in which case firm i obtains strictly less than P(nk)k, a payoff it could obtain by raising the price to P(nk) and
offering capacity. On the other hand, if there exists h = i for which p∗h = P(nk), then for any pi ′ ≤ P(nk), we have
Pa ′ = P(nk) and, thus, by setting qi ′ = k, firm i obtains exactly P(nk)k.
(b) Suppose k ≥ d(0)
n−1 . In this case, n − 1 firms can serve demand at a price equal to marginal cost. To prove
that all strategy profiles (p∗, q∗) ∈ Ea(k, 0) are equilibria, note that Pu(p∗, q∗) = 0 for every (p∗, q∗) ∈ Ea(k, 0) and
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u ∈ {e, a}. Hence πi (p∗, q∗) = π
¯
= 0,∀i ∈ N . Because ∀h ∈ L(0 |p∗, q∗),∑l∈L(0 |p∗ ,q∗ )\{h} qˆ∗l ≥ d(0), residual demand
is zero at every p ∈ (0, p¯]. It thus follows that no firm has a profitable deviation in this case.
(c) Suppose k ∈ (yc, d(0)
n−1 ). We show that strategy profiles in E
a(k, 0) are Nash equilibria under both rules. For u ∈
{e, a}, note that if y
¯
> d(pr ) − (n − 1)k (which we show below), all strategy profiles in Ea(k, 0) yield Pu(p∗, q∗) =
pr , π j (p∗,q∗) = π
¯
and for every firm i = j , π i (p∗, q∗) = prk. By definition of p
¯
, firm j has no incentive to deviate from
(pr, q∗j ). Moreover, a low-price firm, say i , i = j , can neither increase its payoff by slightly undercutting other low-price
firms nor by setting a price in the interval (p
¯
, pr ), because in both cases it would obtain exactly prk. We now show that
such a firm i has no incentive to deviate to the residual demand monopoly price after n − 2 firms have sold k and firm j
has sold q∗j . To this effect, define y
¯
as the unique solution in y to
π
¯
((n − 2)k + y) = pr k.
The uniqueness of y
¯
in the interval (−(n − 2)k, k) follows from π
¯
(0) = max{pm, P(k)} min{d(pm), k} ≥ P(k)k >
pr k, π
¯
((n − 1)k) < pr k, and the fact that π
¯
((n − 2)k + y) is continuous and strictly decreasing as a function of
y on the closed interval [−(n − 2)k, k]. Because π
¯
((n − 2)k + q∗j ) is strictly decreasing in q∗j , if q∗j > y
¯
, then
pr k > π
¯
((n − 2)k + q∗j ). Therefore, if q∗j ≥ y
¯
, firm i prefers to obtain π i (p∗, q∗) = prk rather than raising its price to
pr((n − 2)k + q∗j ) and serving residual demand.
It remains to show that y
¯
> d(pr ) − (n − 1)k. By way of contradiction, suppose first that y
¯
< d(pr ) − (n − 1)k.
Let q∗j = d(pr) − (n − 1)k. Then π¯ ((n − 2)k + q
∗
j ) = maxq≤k{P(q + (n − 2)k + q∗j )q} ≥ P(k + (n − 2)k + q∗j )k =
P(d(pr ))k = pr k, a contradiction to q∗j > y
¯
.
Now suppose, again by way of contradiction, that y
¯
= d(pr ) − (n − 1)k. Then (n − 2)k + y
¯
= d(pr ) − k, so that
π
¯




(d(pr ) − k). We now show that for k > yc, π
¯
(d(pr ) − k) > pr k holds, implying that to obtain
the equality π
¯
((n − 2)k + y
¯
) = pr k, we must have y
¯
> d(pr ) − (n − 1)k. To show that π
¯
(d(pr ) − k) > pr k holds,
suppose first that k > r (d(pr) − k). In this case, we have π
¯
(d(pr ) − k) = P(d(pr ) − k + r (d(pr ) − k))r (d(pr ) − k) >
P(d(pr ) − k + k)k = pr k. If k ≤ r (d(pr) − k) instead, then π
¯
(d(pr ) − k) = P(d(pr ) − k + k)k = pr k. However, we
show that k ≤ r (d(pr) − k) cannot arise for k ∈ (yc, d(0)
n−1 ). Indeed, k ≤ r (d(pr) − k) implies d(pr) ≤ d(pr) − k +
r (d(pr) − k). Because d ′(p) < 0, the last inequality implies pr ≥ P(d(pr) − k + r (d(pr) − k)) or pr((n − 1)k) ≥
pr(d(pr) − k). It thus follows from the fact that pr(q) is decreasing in q that (n − 1)k ≤ d(pr) − k, which in turn implies




> d(pr ) − (n − 1)k. This completes our proof that for k ∈ (yc, d(0)
n−1 ), all strategy profiles in E
a(k, 0) are Nash equilibria
under both the Market Clearing Price and the Maximum Accepted Price rules.
(d) Consider the game e(k, 0). Define qc− ≡ (n − 1)yc. For k > yc, we now show that any (p∗, q∗) where p∗i ≤ p
¯
(qc−)
and q∗i = yc, ∀i , is a Nash equilibrium of e(k, 0). For such strategy profiles, the uniform price is equal to Pe(p∗, q∗) =
P(nyc) and each firm i’s payoff π i (p∗, q∗) is equal to P(nyc)yc. By definition of p
¯
(qc−), no firm has an incentive to undercut
any of its rivals’ prices and expand output above yc. Moreover, because yc is the unique Cournot equilibrium output,
pr(qc−) = P(nyc) and π¯ (q
c
−) = P(nyc)yc, so that no firm has an incentive to set its price above P(nyc) (to sell strictly less
than yc) either. It follows that (p∗, q∗) is an equilibrium of e(k, 0).
In the remainder of the proof, we show that for u ∈ {e, a}, the equilibria characterized above are the only equilibria
of u(k, 0). In the analysis below, let (p∗, q∗) denote a pure strategy equilibrium and, for i ∈ N , let π¯i be firm i’s profit in
the equilibrium.
 Maximum Accepted Price rule
Lemma A1. Suppose k < d(0)
n−1 ; then, for every (p
∗, q∗), p¯ > Pa(p∗, q∗) > 0 and p∗i ≤ Pa(p∗, q∗), ∀i ∈ N .
Proof. It is clear that p¯ > Pa(p∗, q∗) > 0 because both Pa(p∗,q∗) = p¯ and Pa(p∗, q∗) = 0 imply π¯ j = 0, ∀ j . Because
k < d(0)
n−1 , however, we have π¯
> 0, a contradiction to π¯ j ≥ π
¯
in equilibrium. Finally, suppose there exists a firm i setting
p∗i > P
a(p∗, q∗). Then firm i’s profit is equal to zero because its sales are zero. Hence, an argument similar to the above
applies. Q.E.D.
Lemma A2. If (p∗, q∗) is such that there exists a firm i ∈ N for which 0 ≤ p∗i < Pa(p∗, q∗), then q∗i = si(p∗i |p∗, q∗) =
k.
Proof. The proof is in two parts. First we show that each firm i setting p∗i < P
a(p∗, q∗) offers q∗i such that q
∗
i = k. Then,
we show that s∗i = k follows. Suppose contrary to the statement of the lemma that there exists a firm i setting p∗i < Pa(p∗,
q∗) and q∗i < k. It is straightforward to show that for small enough  > 0, P
a(p∗, q∗i + , q∗−i ) = Pa(p∗, q∗). However,
then Pa(p∗,q∗)(q∗i + ) > π¯i = Pa(p∗,q∗)q∗i , a contradiction to (p∗i , q∗i ) being part of an equilibrium. Suppose now that
q∗i = k > s∗i . This can only be the case if firm i sells to residual demand at Pa(p∗, q∗). Then, however, by Definition 2, p∗i
must be the uniform price, which contradicts p∗i < P
a(p∗, q∗). Therefore, p∗i < P
a(p∗, q∗) ⇒ q∗i = si(p∗i |p∗, q∗) = k.
Q.E.D.
Lemma A3. If (p∗, q∗) is such that Pa(p∗, q∗) > 0, then either (i) exactly one firm sets Pa(p∗, q∗), or (ii) si(p∗i |
p∗, q∗) = k, ∀i ∈ N .
C© RAND 2007.
1064 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Proof. Suppose contrary to the statement of the lemma that a group of l firms, l ≥ 2, tie at p = Pa(p∗, q∗) > 0. It
follows immediately that if firm h sets p∗h = p, but sh(p |p∗, q∗) < k, then firm h can strictly increase its profit by slightly
undercutting firms setting p and offering capacity to earn:








This inequality and Lemma A2 imply that in equilibrium, either there is only one firm setting Pa(p∗, q∗) or si(p∗i |p∗,
q∗) = k, ∀i ∈ N . Q.E.D.
Lemma A4. Suppose k ≤ yc; then in every equilibrium, Pa(p∗, q∗) = P(nk).
Proof. Suppose Pa(p∗, q∗) < P(nk). Then the (possibly multiple) firm(s) setting Pa(p∗, q∗) could increase profit strictly
by offering and selling capacity at P(nk) instead. Suppose Pa(p∗, q∗) > P(nk) > 0. In this case, from Lemma A3, there
can only be one firm, say i, setting the uniform price. As from Lemma A2, sj(p∗j |p∗, q∗) = k, ∀ j = i , it follows that
πi (p∗, q∗) = Pa(p∗, q∗)si (p∗i |p∗, q∗) < P(nk)k = π¯ , a contradiction to equilibrium behavior. Q.E.D.
Lemma A5. Suppose k ≥ d(0)
n−1 ; then in every equilibrium, P
a(p∗, q∗) = 0.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Pa(p∗, q∗) > 0. Then from Lemma A3 and k ≥ d(0)
n−1 , it must be the case that
there is a unique h setting p∗h = Pa(p∗, q∗). However, from Lemma A2 and k ≥ d(0)n−1 ,
∑
j∈L−(Pa ) qˆ j = (n − 1) d(0)n−1 = d(0),
contradicting the fact that residual demand is strictly positive at Pa(p∗, q∗) > 0 and, thus, the definition of the uniform
price. Therefore, Pa(p∗, q∗) = 0. Q.E.D.
The fact that the complete set of equilibria of a(k, 0) is given by (i)–(iii) follows from combining Lemmas A1–A5
and constructing strategy profiles that satisfy the properties in the lemmas. It is straightforward to show that the only such
strategy profiles from which no firm has an incentive to deviate are those characterized in Proposition 1. It is then clear
that all Nash equilibria of a(k, 0) are given by (i)–(iii).
Market Clearing Price rule. Lemma A6 below identifies the major difference between the two definitions of the uniform
price. When the Market Clearing Price rule is used, the uniform price may be a price not set by any firm. Lemma A6
identifies the properties that an equilibrium in which no firm sets the resulting uniform price must satisfy. It follows from
Lemma A6 that all such equilibria are given by strategy profiles we characterized and are contained in Ee(k, 0) if k ≤ yc
and in C(0) if k > yc. In all other equilibria, at least one firm must set the uniform price and it is straightforward to show
that in this case, Lemmas A1–A5 derived for the Maximum Accepted Price rule apply to the Market Clearing Price rule
as well. Thus, all equilibria of e(k, 0) are characterized by (i)–(iii) in the statement of Proposition 1.
Lemma A6. If (p∗, q∗) is such that p∗i = Pe(p∗, q∗), ∀i ∈ N , then p∗i < Pe(p∗, q∗) = P(n min{k, yc}) and q∗i = si(p∗i |p∗,
q∗) = min{k, yc}.
Proof. First, it is clear thatPe(p∗,q∗) > 0, because otherwise, it must be the case that there exists a firm j setting the uniform
price p∗j = 0. Second, p∗i < Pe(p∗, q∗) must hold for every i. If this were not the case, a firm setting its price strictly above
Pe(p∗, q∗) would obtain a payoff of zero, which is strictly less than what it would obtain by offering a positive quantity at





suppose that k ≤ yc. Then it is clear that in equilibrium, Pe(p∗, q∗) = P(nk). Otherwise it must be the case that some






j . However, k ≤ yc, such a firm could clearly increase its profit by offering k
at a price at or below the resulting uniform price to earn P(k +∑i∈N\{ j} q∗i )k instead. Hence, we must have p∗i < P(nk)
and q∗i = si(p∗i |p∗, q∗) = k.
Suppose now that k > yc. If an equilibrium (p∗, q∗) in which no firm sets the uniform price and at least one




h ). Equilibria with
q∗i = k and p∗i < Pe(p∗, q∗) ∀i ∈ N are not possible because each firm earns P(nk)k < π¯ at such profiles.Moreover, we can easily rule out more than one firm having q∗i = k. Now consider strategy profiles such that
there exists j for which q∗j = k and ∀i = j , q∗i = k. Then if p∗h = Pe(p∗, q∗) ∀h is to hold at such profiles, it
must be the case that q∗j = r ((n − 1)k) = d(pr ) − (n − 1)k, p∗i ≤ p
¯
∀i = j , and Pe(p∗, q∗) = pr. If k ∈ (yc, d(0)
n−1 ),
it follows immediately from y
¯
> d(pr ) − (n − 1)k that a firm i for which q∗i = k has an incentive to deviate from
such profiles. If k ≥ d(0)
n−1 , then p
r = 0. Hence, p∗i < pr = Pe(p∗, q∗) is not possible. This completes the proof of
Lemma A6. Q.E.D.
Finally, for both uniform price rules, simple computations show that for all values of capacity k and each firm
i ∈ N , there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which firm i obtains its minmax payoff π
¯
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. To prove Lemma 3, we first show that τme satisfies the properties of a perfectly collusive stationary
path with equal sharing. From Definition 1, on τme, the assumption k > d(p
m )
n
implies that pi = p
¯
(qm− ) < p
m . Moreover,∑n




one-period profit is equal to pm d(p
m )
n
, as required on a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing. We now
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show that there does not exist a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing τ , τ = τme, on which some firm i’s
incentive to deviate is strictly lower than it is on τme, i = 1, . . . , n.
Let τ be some perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing. Then τ must satisfy the properties stated in
Lemma 2.
(i) Suppose that on τ , some firms set their price equal to the monopoly price. We first show that the incentive to deviate
cannot increase for any of the firms if every firm i setting pi = pm also sets qi = k. To this effect, let l ≥ 1 be the number of
elements of L(pm). By (iii) in Lemma 2, for firms in L(pm), the residual demand is R(pm ) = d(pm) − (n − l) d(pm )
n
= l d(pm )
n
.
Furthermore, equal sharing requires that if i ∈ L(pm), si = min{qˆi , qˆi∑




} = d(pm )
n
. However, then it is easy to
see that setting qi = k, ∀i ∈ L(pm) implies si = d(pm )n . Hence every firm is selling its share of monopoly output at a
uniform price of pm. Moreover, the incentive to deviate of a firm in L(pm) cannot be larger than if qi < k, whereas the
incentive to deviate of a firm j setting pj < pm is unchanged.
(ii) We now show that if on some perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing τ , there exist i and j , i = j ,
for which pi < pj < pm, then, if the path τ ′ differs from τ only insofar as pj is reduced to equal pi on τ ′, the incentive to
deviate of any firm cannot be greater on τ ′ than it is on τ . First, from Lemma 1, firm h’s deviation profit is weakly lower
on τ ′ than it is on τ , h = 1, . . . , n. Second, note that each firm’s one-period profit is the same on τ ′ as it is on τ . Because
firm h’s incentive to deviate on τ is given by the difference π ∗h (p−h, q−h) − pm d(p
m )
n
, π ∗h (p
′
−h, q−h) ≤ π ∗h (p−h, q−h) implies
that, for every h = 1, . . . , n, the incentive to deviate on the perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing τ ′ is
weakly lower than it is on τ . It follows from the above arguments that in the remainder, we can restrict attention to paths
on which any firm setting its price equal to pm offers its capacity at that price and all firms setting price strictly below pm
all set the same price.
(iii) Next we show that on a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing τ , a firm i’s incentive to deviate
is minimized when the remaining n − 1 firms set their price equal to p
¯




by the definition of pr(q), the worst possible deviation profit firm i can guarantee itself when lower-price firms offer
q < d(0) is equal to
pr (q)[d(pr (q)) − q],
its residual demand monopoly profit after lower-price firms have sold their aggregate quantity. The above expression
is decreasing in q. Because on τ , every firm setting p < pm must offer d(p
m )
n
, firm i’s worst possible deviation profit
is minimized when the number of low-price firms is the largest, that is, when the remaining firms’ aggregate quantity
offered is qm−. In this case, firm i’s deviation profit is given by
pr (qm− )[d(p
r (qm− )) − qm− ] = π¯ (q
m
− ). (A1)





(qm− ) ≤ pr (qm− ) < pm . Furthermore, if on τ , each firm setting ph < pm sets
ph = p
¯
(qm− ), then firm i’s profit from an optimal deviation is indeed equal to its worst possible deviation profit given
by (A1). It follows that if on the path τ , every firm sets its price equal to p
¯
(qm− ) and offers
d(pm )
n
, all firms have the
same incentive to deviate. Furthermore, each firm’s deviation profit is the lowest that can be obtained from a one-period
deviation on a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing. Because τ = τme, we have shown that the path τme
minimizes all firms’ incentives to deviate in the class of perfectly collusive stationary paths with equal sharing. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. We first characterize δ¯. From Lemma 2, it follows that the only perfectly collusive stationary path
with equal sharing on which every firm offers its capacity is τ sm, where on τ sm the price-quantity pairs for each firm are
as follows.
pi = pm and qi = k, ∀i .
From the definition of si, sales on τ sm are equal to
k
nk
d(pm) = d(pm )
n
and the uniform price is pm. Hence τ sm is a perfectly
collusive stationary path with equal sharing. From (1), on τ sm, the symmetric incentive constraints are
(1 − δ)pm
(













Thus τ sm is sustainable if and only if (A2) holds. Solving for δ from (A2) satisfied with equality, we obtain
δ¯ = p
m min{k, d(pm)} − pm d(pm )
n
pm min{k, d(pm)} − π
¯
. (A3)
It follows from the above arguments that if perfect collusion with equal sharing is sustainable for δ < δ¯, it must be the
case that some firm withholds. Hence, for δ < δ¯, if perfect collusion with equal sharing is sustainable on a stationary
path, it must be the case that there exists N (δ) ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that on that path, N (δ) firms withhold capacity. We now
show that there exists δ
¯
e < δ¯ such that if δ ≥ δ
¯
e and n firms withhold capacity, then there exists a perfect equilibrium
stationary path that supports perfect collusion with equal sharing. To this effect, consider the path τme characterized in
Lemma 3. From Lemma 3, τme minimizes incentives to deviate. Furthermore, on τme, each firm’s deviation profit is given
by (A1). It thus follows that δ
¯
e is the value of δ that solves
C© RAND 2007.


















After rearranging, we obtain
δ
¯
e = π¯ (q
m









(qm− ) < p




e < δ¯ follows. We now show that the
maximum incentive to deviate on τme is strictly lower than on a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing on
which no more than n − 1 firms withhold. Suppose τ ′′ = τme is such a path. Then, on τ ′′, there must exist a firm i whose
deviation profit is greater than or equal to π
¯
(q), where q < (n − 1)d(p
m )
n
is the quantity offered by firm i’s rivals at prices





(y) is strictly decreasing in y, qm− > q implies π¯
(qm− ) < π¯
(q). Hence, on
τ ′′, the maximum incentive to deviate is strictly greater than on τme. Hence, it follows that for δ = δ
¯
e, withholding by all
firms is required to sustain perfect collusion with equal sharing on a stationary path. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. To prove Lemma 4, we first show that, for each i ∈ N , τmai satisfies the properties of a perfectly
collusive stationary path with equal sharing. On τmai , the assumption k >
d(pm )
n
implies that for j = i, p j = p
¯
(qm− ) < p
m .
From Definition 2, pi = pm and
∑
j =i q j = ( n − 1n )d(pm) implies that the uniform price is equal to pm. Because each
low-price firm sells its quantity ceiling of d(p
m )
n
, its one-period profit is equal to pm d(p
m )
n
. Moreover, firm i’s profit is equal
to pm(d(pm) − (n − 1)d(pm)/n) = pm d(pm )
n
as well. Hence, τmai satisfies all of the requirements of a perfectly collusive
stationary path with equal sharing. We now show that there does not exist a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal
sharing τ on which the maximum incentive to deviate across firms is strictly less than on τmai .
First, note that from Lemma 2, at least one firm has to set its price equal to pm. It follows from an argument similar
to (i) in the proof of Lemma 3 that if firm i sets pi = pm, then the incentive to deviate cannot increase for any of the firms
if qi = k. Arguments similar to (iii) in Lemma 3 establish that to minimize the incentive to deviate of a firm setting its




Suppose l ≥ 1 firms set p < pm and offer d(pm )
n
each, as required by Lemma 2. Arguments similar to (ii) in the proof
of Lemma 3 imply that profits will not change for any of the firms, and incentives to deviate will be no higher, if each of
these firms sets its price equal to the minimum of the submitted prices. Furthermore, incentives to deviate cannot increase
for any of the firms, if the l low-price firms set p = p
¯




m). Suppose then that the l
low-price firms set p = p
¯
(qm− ). It is straightforward to check that for such a firm, deviating from the path by undercutting
p
¯
(qm− ) cannot be optimal if it results in the uniform price being reduced to p
¯
(qm− ). If l = 1, the optimal deviation clearly
consists of undercutting pm and offering k, for every k. If l > 1 and firm j is a low-price firm, an optimal deviation takes
one of two possible forms depending on the value of k. Either firm j offers the minimum of k and a quantity infinitesimally
less than (n − l + 1)d(p
m )
n
at any price at or below p
¯




















))− qHl ] , where qHl ≡ (l − 1)d(pm)n . (A6)
Upon inspecting (A5) and (A6), it is clear that optimal deviation profits do not depend on p, the common price of the
low-price firms, as long as p ≤ p
¯
(qm− ). Therefore, if each of the l firms sets p < p
¯
(qm− ), incentives to deviate would not be
lower for any of the firms. If k ≤ (n − l + 1)d(pm )
n
, it is clear that pr(qHl ) ≥ pm, and thus the deviation that yields (A6) is not
a possible deviation (as then the deviating firm would be setting a higher price than all n − 1 remaining firms). In this
case, firm j’s optimal deviation profit is given by (A5) and equals pmk. If (n − l + 1)d(p
m )
n
< k ≤ r (qHl ), then pr(qHl ) = P(k +
qHl ) < p
m. In this case, firm j’s optimal deviation consists of selling its capacity at pr(qHl ) < p
m. Finally, if k > r (qHl ),
pr(qHl ) = P(r (qHl ) + qHl ) < pm and firm j’s optimal deviation consists of setting the residual demand monopoly price
after l − 1 firms have sold their quantity, and offering qj ∈ [r (qHl ), k] for sale. It is clear that deviation profits in (A5) and
(A6) are nonincreasing in l. Therefore, they are minimized subject to the constraint that l ≤ n − 1, by setting l = n − 1.
It follows that on the path τmai , all low-price firms have the same incentive to deviate. Moreover, it is straightforward to
check that this incentive to deviate is strictly higher than firm i’s. As we have argued that it is not possible to hold a firm
for which pj < pm to a lower incentive to deviate on a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing, the proof of
Lemma 4 is complete. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. For every k > d(p
m )
n
, it is clear that if no firm withholds output, perfect collusion with equal
sharing is sustainable on the stationary path if and only if the path τ sm defined in the proof of Proposition 3 is sustainable.
Hence, without any withholding, perfect collusion with equal sharing is sustainable on the stationary path if and only if
δ ≥ δ¯. A firm’s optimal one-period deviation profit on τ sm is equal to pm min{k, d(pm)}. From Lemma 4, on the path
that minimizes the maximum incentive to deviate, τmai , the maximum incentive to deviate across firms, is the incentive to
deviate of any low-price firm j, for i , j ∈ N , j = i . On τmai , for j = i , firm j’s optimal deviation profit is equal to either
C© RAND 2007.
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(A5) or (A6) above after substituting for l = n − 1. (A5) is then equivalent to pm min{k, 2d(pm )
n
}. It is clear that if n = 2 or
n > 2 and k ≤ 2d(pm )
n
, for j = i , firm j’s optimal deviation yields pmk, in which case τmai does not strictly relax incentives
to deviate when compared to τ sm.
Now suppose n > 2 and k > 2d(p
m )
n
. An argument similar to that made in the proof of Proposition 3 implies that
for δ < δ¯, if perfect collusion with equal sharing is sustainable on a stationary path, it must be the case that there exists
M(δ) ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that on that path, M(δ) firms withhold capacity. We now show that there exists δ
¯
a < δ¯ such that
if δ ≥ δ
¯
a and n − 1 firms withhold capacity, then there exists a perfect equilibrium stationary path that supports perfect
collusion with equal sharing. Indeed, consider the path τmai . Because n > 2 and k >
2d(pm )
n
, on τmai , for j = i , firm j’s
payoff from an optimal deviation is given by (A6). Letting qH ≡ (n − 2)
n
d(pm), (A6) is equivalent to
π H ≡ pr (qH ) [d (pr (qH ))− qH ] .
Because n > 2 and k > 2d(p
m )
n
hold by assumption, P(k + qH ) < pm. Moreover, if k is such that pr(qH ) = P(k + qH ),
then it is clear that because qH > 0, pr(qH ) < pm as well. Hence,
π H < pm min{k, d(pm)}. (A7)






solution in δ from any low-price firm’s incentive constraint satisfied with equality, which using (1) is given by
(1 − δ)
(

















H − pm d(pm )
n
π H − π
¯
. (A8)
Using (A3) and (A8), it follows from (A7) that δ
¯
a < δ¯.
Finally, it is clear that the maximum deviation profit is strictly lower on τmai than on any other perfectly collusive
stationary path with equal sharing on which no more than n − 2 firms withhold. Hence, for δ = δ
¯
a , withholding by at
least n − 1 firms is required to sustain perfect collusion with equal sharing on a stationary path and M(δ
¯
a) = n − 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let (pi , qi ) = ((plii , qlii ))Lili=1 denote firm i’s strategy and let (p−i , q−i ) be a vector of firm i’s rival’s
strategies. We show that for both uniform price auction rules, π ∗i = π ∗i (p−i , q−i ) = sup(pi ,qi ) πi (pi , qi , p−i , q−i ) remains
the supremum of deviation payoffs when restricting firm i to strategies using a single step (Li = 1). Throughout the proof,
we ignore price steps li such that p
li
i is strictly greater than the uniform price. Such price steps are indeed irrelevant
because the quantity sold at such steps is equal to zero, so that firm i cannot increase its profit by including them in its
strategy. Let ps∗i be the set of prices submitted by firm i and P
u∗ = Pu(pi, qi, p−i , q−i ) be the uniform price. First, Pu∗ = 0
is only possible if firm i’s residual demand at strictly positive prices is equal to zero. In this case, π ∗i = 0 is independent
of firm i’s strategy and can therefore be obtained by using a single-step bidding function (for instance, offering k at pi =
0). Suppose that Pu∗ > 0. There are two cases: either Pu∗ ∈ ps∗i or plii < Pu∗, ∀li . Consider first the case Pu∗ ∈ ps∗i . Under
both pricing rules, tying with a group of firms at Pu∗ cannot be optimal if si(Pu∗ |p, q) > 0 but s∗i = si ((pi, qi), p−i , q−i )
< min{d(Pu∗), k}. Indeed, in this case, firm i could strictly increase its profit by slightly undercutting Pu∗. Suppose then
that s∗i = min{d(Pu∗), k}. It is clear that s∗i = d(Pu∗) is not possible if firm i is not the only firm setting the uniform price.
Suppose then that s∗i = k. In this case, under both Definitions 1 and 2 for the uniform price, it is straightforward to show
that firm i can obtain π ∗i = Pu∗k by using a one-step strategy (p, k), where p < Pu∗. The case in which Pu∗ ∈ ps∗i and
si(Pu∗ |p, q) = 0 is similar to the case in which Pu∗ ∈ ps∗i and is discussed below. We first address the case in which firm
i is the only firm with Pu∗ in its strategy. If firm i is the only firm with Pu∗ in its strategy, then
























p∈psj q j (p) −
∑
p∈ps∗i \Pu∗ qi (p) (in which case s
∗
i = min{d(Pu∗), k}),




p∈psj q j (p) −
∑
p∈ps∗i \Pu∗ qi (p). Thus









However, this is exactly what firm i would obtain by setting the single step (Pu∗, q∗i ), where q
∗
i = d(Pu∗) −∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
p∈psj q j (p), instead. Finally, consider the case p
li
i < P
u∗, ∀li . Then, from Definitions 1 and 2, it must be
the case that π ∗i = Pu∗s∗i is independent of firm i’s prices plii because plii < Pu∗,∀li . A similar argument applies to the case
in which Pu∗ ∈ ps∗i and si(Pu∗ |p, q) = 0, as the only price steps relevant to firm i’s sales are those for which plii < Pu∗.
Therefore, in both cases, the single-step bidding function (p,
∑
z∈ps∗i \{Pu∗} qi (z)), where p < P
u∗, achieves a payoff equal
to π ∗i . Q.E.D.
C© RAND 2007.
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Proof of Proposition 7. First, it is straightforward to show that τ  is a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal
sharing. Furthermore, for  ∈ (0, d(pm)], on τ  , every firm has the same incentive to deviate in every period. It is simple
to check that if d(p
m ) + (n − 1)
n
≥ k, a firm’s profit from an optimal unilateral deviation is obtained by expanding output up
to k at p
¯
(q−) and is equal to
π ∗i = pmk. (A9)
If k > d(p
m ) + (n − 1)
n
, then profit from an optimal deviation is obtained by setting the residual demand monopoly price after
firm i’s rivals have sold q− and is equal to
π ∗i = π¯ (q

−). (A10)
We now show that τ  minimizes incentives to deviate in the class of perfectly collusive stationary paths with equal sharing.
First note that if  = d(pm), then the quantity offered at the price pm must be no lower than d(pm). It follows immediately
that the path that minimizes incentives to deviate is τ  , the path on which all firms offer their capacity at the monopoly
price in every period. In the remainder of the proof of Proposition 7, assume  ∈ (0, d(pm)).
Because on a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing it must be the case that Pa = pm, it is clear
that incentives to deviate cannot be lowered by moving some quantity offered at p
¯




m. Furthermore, for every i, we can rule out steps such that p > Pa = pm and qi(p) > 0 because setting such
steps does not affect the outcome (because a firm’s sales are equal to zero at such prices), but may increase incentives to
deviate. Because on a perfectly collusive stationary path with equal sharing, for a given (plii , q
li




affects neither firm i’s sales nor its profit, it follows that we can, without loss of generality, restrict attention to stationary
paths on which firms use at most two steps in their bidding function. Moreover, the analysis may be further restricted
to the two-step bidding functions that satisfy the following: if there exists an i and an li for which p
li
i ∈ psi is such that
plii < p
m , then plii can be reduced to p = minh,lh {plhh } with the corresponding quantity qlii provided at that p. Indeed, this
neither affects the profit obtained by any of the firms nor can it increase incentives to deviate. Hence all firms with a
step at a price strictly below pm may move all such steps to the common price p = minh,lh {plhh } without affecting firm
profits or increasing the incentive of any firm to deviate. Furthermore, letting q−i = ∑h =i qh(p) be the total quantity
offered by firm i’s rivals at the common price p, the fact that firms have at most two steps in their strategy implies that
q−i is the quantity offered at every price in the interval [p, pm). It follows that, other things being equal, the maximum
incentive to deviate is minimized if p is set equal to pl = mini∈N {p
¯
(q−i )}, the highest price that no firm would want to
undercut. Additionally, for every firm j such that pm ∈ psj , setting qj(pm) = k − qj(pl) cannot increase any firm’s incentive
to deviate (as then, when firm j ties with a group of firms at pm, it cannot deviate by increasing its quantity offered at
pm without decreasing its quantity offered at pl). Finally, to minimize firm i’s deviation profit (and thus its incentive to
deviate), q−i , the quantity offered by firm i’s rivals at a price p strictly below pm, must be as large as possible. This quantity
must also satisfy
∑
h∈N qh(p) = q−i + qi (p) ≤ d(pm) − . Thus for every i, this maximum quantity is obtained when∑
h∈N qh(p) = d(pm) −  or, equivalently, q−i = d(pm) −  − qi(p). It follows that the maximum incentive to deviate
is minimized at (q 1(p), . . . , qn(p)), satisfying q−i = d(pm) −  − qi(p) = d(pm) −  − qj(p) = q− j , ∀i , j , i = j and∑
h∈N qh(p) = d(pm) − . This is a system of n linear equations in n unknowns (qi(p) for i = 1, . . . , n). Solving the system
yields q1(p) = · · · = qi (p) = · · · = qn(p) = d(pm ) − n . It then follows directly that to minimize the maximum incentive to
deviate, pl = p
¯
(q−) is sufficient, and that each firm must offer a quantity equal to k − [ d(p
m ) − 
n
] at pm. Q.E.D.
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